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EVERESTS OF THE MUNDANE: CONFLICT OF
INTEREST IN REAL-WORLD LEGAL
PRACTICE
Susan P.Shapiro"
INTRODUCTION

Perhaps the most fundamental difference between legal scholarship
and social science is reflected in disagreements about what constitutes
a "good" case and where to look for one. While lawyers usually turn
to the decisions of the highest courts, social scientists are as likely to
look at the lowest courts or, indeed, at agreements, injuries, misdeeds,
and disputes that never make it to court-or even a lawyer's officeat all. What is precedent in law, meticulously drafted in opinions,
religiously cited by practitioners, enshrined in legal case books, and
methodically dissected in the law school classroom, is deviance in
science and relegated to courses affectionately called "Nuts, Sluts, and
Perverts."
While a law professor crafting scholarship, say, on conflict of
interest in legal practice would probably sit in front of a computer
screen, logged on to Lexis or Westlaw, this social scientist drove
almost ten thousand miles across a single state to see conflict of
interest as it is experienced on the ground. While I amassed many
cases along my road trip, few of them look much like those analyzed
by my counterpart collecting cases in the law library. Just as the social
and natural world look different at the top of Everest than at the base
camp, where explorers look for cases determines, or at least
constrains, what they will find. It takes a lot to get to and survive on
the top of the mountain, and many down below do not even aspire to
make the climb. And others who do, never make it. In this Article, I
share some sights from the base camp and reveal how discordant they
are from the vast, intricate canvas meticulously crafted at the summit
by legal academics.
You know, if we were absolutely pristine
and followed the academic
2
literature, we wouldn't be in business.
Senior Research Fellow, American Bar Foundation. A.B.. University of Michigan
(1970), M. Phil., Yale (1974), Ph.D., Yale (1980).
1. Some material presented in this Article is drawvn from my forthcoming book,
Tangled Loyalties: Conflict of Interestin Legal Practice,published by the University of

Michigan Press [hereinafter Shapiro, Tangled Loyalties].
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Practicing lawyers do not make many positive statements about the
prodigious literature at the summit, though they can usually cite one
or two publications that they have found useful. The above quote
from my interviews reflects a common sentiment among respondents
that the literature is sometimes naive and frequently out of touch with
what actually happens in daily legal practice. Many others expressed
disappointment and frustration at how often they are unable to
extract from the literature any practical guidance about how to deal
with the difficult conflicts they face.
In this Article, I look at what respondents tell me were their "most
difficult" conflicts of interest. Their stories represent the "cases" that
I will examine. These problematic cases are the "Everests" of day-today practice-those that rise to the top-mirroring the cases that
make it to the appellate courts and become the grist of the legal
academy. Yet the mirror images are barely recognizable. As in a
house of mirrors, the reflections cast by the two Everests appear
misshapen and distorted. The distortions, of course, arise from what
is considered a case and how such cases are collected.
Since I have argued that where one looks affects what one will find,
I will briefly document the research design that determined where I
would look for cases. Because of the dearth of basic empirical
information on how conflicts of interest arise in legal practice and how
lawyers respond to them, I planned an itinerary that would encompass
the diverse settings in which private practitioners work. I restricted
the journey to a single state, Illinois, to control for variations in each
state's conflict-of-interest rules that might otherwise confound the
results. I visited a random sample of 128 law firms, stratified by size
2. Interview #26 from a Chicago firm with more than 100 lawyers.
3. The fundamental tenet regarding conflict of interest is stated in Rule 1.7 of the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct:

(a) A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of that client
will be directly adverse to another client, unless:

(1) the lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not adversely
affect the relationship with the other client; and

(2) each client consents after consultation.
(b) A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of that client
may be materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to another client or
to a third person, or by the lawyer's own interests, unless:
(1) the lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not be adversely
affected; and
(2) the client consents after consultation. When representation of multiple
clients in a single matter is undertaken, the consultation shall include

explanation of the implications of the common representation and the
advantages and risks involved.
Model Rules of Prof'l Conduct R. 1.7 (1983). Of course, conflicts of interest are far
more complex and nuanced than articulated in these simple rules. See generally
Shapiro, Tangled Loyalties, supra note 1; Susan Shapiro, When You Can't Just Say
"No": Controlling Lawyers' Conflicts of Interest, in Social Science, Social Policy, and
the Law 322 (Patricia Ewick et al. eds., 1999).
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and location, 4 to insure that firms of all sizes in downtown Chicago,

Chicago neighborhoods and suburbs, and in large, medium, and small
communities downstate, as well as those that offer the only legal

practice in town, would be represented in the study.5 A stunning 92%
of the firms selected actually participated in the study. As a result,
concerns about non-response bias-the possibility that firms included
in the study are atypical (for example, have less to hide about their

conflict-of-interest experience)- are minimal.
In each firm, I interviewed the person or persons with most
In large firms,
responsibility for conflict-of-interest issues.
respondents were usually the Chair of the Conflicts, Ethics,
Professional Responsibility, or New Business Committee. In smaller
firms, respondents often served as Managing Partner, a member of the
Executive or Management Committee, or a name partner.
Interviewees were questioned about whether, how, and to what extent
conflicts of interest arise in their practice, and how their firms identify
and resolve potential conflicts. Their responses drew on their
personal experience, as well as on experiences in their role as ethics or

conflicts czar or firm administrator. Ninety-seven percent of the
interviews were conducted in person, and more than three-quarters
were tape recorded and subsequently transcribed. On average,
interviews ran an hour and a quarter.

The interviews yielded a wealth of information, not only on conflict
of interest, but on clients, the social organization and economics of

law firms, firm governance and self-regulation, intra-firm conflict,
malpractice insurance, legal careers and mobility, the marketplace for
legal talent, social networks, social change, legal communities and
4. If I had selected my destinations purely randomly-say from a list of
registered lawyers in the state-I would have spent almost three-quarters of my time
in Chicago's Cook County and with either solo practitioners or lawyers practicing in
larger firms, since that is how lawyers in illinois cluster. See Attorney Registration
and Disciplinary Comm'n of the Supreme Court of Ill., Annual Report, at 5 (1995);
Barbara A. Curran & Clara N. Carson, The Lawyer Statistical Report: The U.S. Legal
Profession in the 1990s, at 83 (1994). Stratified sampling insured that significant, but
less common, structures and loci of legal practice would be included in the study.
5. Because of this stratified sampling design, the sample is not statistically
representative of the population of Illinois lawyers. However, the firms were selected
randomly; those in a given cluster had an equal probability of being included. The
sampled firms, then, do typify the population of firms in the various clusters from
which they were drawn. While the 128 firms comprise less than 1% of the law firms in
the state, they do encompass a much more sizable number of practitioners. About
one fifth of the lawyers in Illinois work in firms included in the sample. My fimdings
bear, then, on the experience of a sizable proportion of private legal practitioners in
Illinois. Moreover, because a number of the larger firms have branch offices in other
states or are themselves branch offices of national law firms headquartered elsewhere,
I learned a bit about conflict of interest in other locations and under different legal
regimes. I also conducted a number of pilot interviews in large law firms in two other
Midwestern states. For more detail on the research design as well as on the ways in
which Illinois may be atypical of other states, see Shapiro, Tangled Loyalties, supra
note 1.
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cultures, the structure of expertise, even substantive law. I learned in
exquisite detail the varied ways in which conflicts of interest arise in
different kinds of law firms and practices. I also learned about: how
firms seek to avoid conflicts, how they identify potential or actual
conflicts, evaluate them, resolve them, interact with clients and
adversaries over them; firm self-regulatory structures to deal with
conflicts; the distribution of expertise within the firm in ethics and
professional responsibility; the influence of malpractice insurers;
regulatory failures; the legacy of conflicts of interest on hiring, law
firm growth, substantive specialization, intra-firm discord, and the
like. I also gained perspective on how this has changed over time.
But here we explore only lawyers' descriptions of their most
difficult conflicts.6 Of more than one hundred accounts offered in the
interviews, only seven make questions of law or legal interpretation
problematic. Four of these problematic accounts described cases that
raised questions about who may be deemed a client, two concerned
when a client can be considered a former client, and one addressed
which of several sets of contradictory conflicts rules applies in a multistate transaction. The other 95% of the cases involved clashing
interests that aroused wrenching business or client-relations problems
or irate colleagues, not questions of law. Two respondents explained:
The complexity of the conflict law is there and it presents a problem.
And we're lawyers; we can deal with those things. You make
decisions. Sometimes you're right and sometimes you're wrong, as
the cases decide later. But you make decisions. The toughest part
of the job is the personal part of the job-either from the client or
from your partners-where they absolutely either do not understand
or refuse to understand what's going on. In the substantive areas,
though, there are areas that are tougher rather than easier because
there's no clarity in the law. So, it's hard to advise your client or
your partner. . . . The law is unclear in many areas of conflicts. And
because it's unclear-like it is, maybe, with the Internal Revenue
Code or any other substantive area, the Uniform Commercial
Code-your job is made more difficult because you have to advise
based on unclear principles. But that's what lawyers do. Again, my
hardest job is not to do that. We can ferret out and make our
judgments. My hardest job is to deal with the personalities and the
individuals who just don't seem to be willing to regard that as a
significant part of the practice of law-either the client or the
lawyer.7
The most difficult ones tend to be the business conflicts rather than
the ethical conflicts. The ethical conflicts are in a way easier to
manage because you have the source to look to. And, once you
6. See generally Shapiro, Tangled Loyalties, supra note 1, for a complete
discussion of research results.
7. Interview #11 from a Chicago firm with more than 100 lawyers.
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have an answer, the lawyers... can't really argue with it. It's what
the rules are and they're obliged to follow them. I know there are
some instances where we might get an absolute disagreement and
then maybe we'd have to get an opinion. The much harder ones are
the business conflicts. Because you're trying to manage a business
where it's
and enhance its profitability and we just have situations
8
very difficult to satisfy these competing interests.
When firms must decline a new matter because it poses a potential
conflict of interest, neither clients nor the lawyers who hoped to
undertake the representation are especially happy. Ongoing clients
often consider this a betrayal or a breach of loyalty, resent having to
bring a new law firm up to speed to represent their interests, and
suspect that their lawyers are somehow advancing the interests of
their adversaries.
Li: 9 My toughest conflict situation is the entrepreneur who cannot
fathom why you cannot represent him and why you have to have
him sign this letter that he cannot understand, and doesn't know
what it means, and doesn't want you to explain what it means. And
[he] says... "Joe Jones in my office has been my lawyer for twenty
years. What do you mean, because you represent Prudential, he
can't handle this loan that I'm getting from Prudential?"... He
doesn't want to know about the concept of legal conflicts. He
doesn't care about the concept of legal conflicts. The lawyer...
dreads the possibility of losing his favorite client over this. And so
there's great economic and personal pressure brought to bear on us.
... That's the hardest thing for me to deal with, because you're
dealing with a partner who is antagonized by it; you're dealing with
a person who really refuses to understand the issue or see it from the
It's a noethical side and thinks that we're just blowing smoke ...
win situation somehow.
... L2: ...But let me tell you the flip side of that too, in terms of
dealing with somebody who's very, very sophisticated. I had a
situation-now, about a year ago-where one of our partners came
to me and he says, "I have this problem. I represent a corporationa national... international corporation-very sophisticated. They
want to sell off a piece of property, and they found a buyer." There
was some plant downstate somewhere and they wanted to get rid of
it and they were happy to find a buyer. The buyer was all set, and
we were going toward the closing and he lost his financing. The
client wants to sell this property. It just wants to get rid of it. So the
client said, "I'll help you find financing." They looked around and
they found a sibling corporation that is also an international
corporation-tremendously sophisticated, etc., etc.,-that is in the
lending business. And they said, "... . We will provide the financing,
8. Interview #7 from a Chicago firm with more than 100 lawyers.
9. In these dialogues, "L," "Li," and "L2" all indicate statements by a
lawyer/respondent. "S" is the author.
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corporation said, "Yeah, fine, we'll guarantee the loan." And then
they come to my partner and say, "we want you to document that
guarantee." So he says [to me], "you tell me I shouldn't be on both
sides of a guarantee. Here I'm on it. What are we going to do?" So
I said, "Well, let's just tell them that we don't want to end up
representing a lender and a borrower, a guarantor and a guarantee
type situation. We don't want to be on both sides. And just tell
them that." He's dealing, you know, with two in-house counselone from each corporation-and they're both wholly owned by a
parent corporation. So, he goes back and says, ". .. Tell the lender

to get somebody else to represent them on the guarantee. We'll do
everything but the guarantee. And they can just have somebody do
the guarantee." And the lender comes back and says, "No, I think
this is ridiculous. Why don't you people do it?" You know, and this
is a lawyer! And so we said, "We just like to avoid situations like
this. We think there's this conflict there and we're questioning
whether it can be waived or not. We just don't want to do it. We
want to avoid doing it." So, he comes back to me and says-this is
the lawyer from the lending corporation-he says, "well, there's a
whole slew of case law that, for purposes of conflicts, you should
consider affiliated companies as one company. Therefore, how can
there be a conflict because we're all one company for conflict
purposes?" And the bottom line was, I said to him, "listen, there is
a reason you want this guarantee. And you can tell me 'til you're
blue in the face that it means nothing; that we're mere scriveners;
there's no implications to it. To me, the very fact that you want this
indicates to me that it's of significance somewhere in this corporate
structure of yours, and that there's a conflict looming there." Now,
meanwhile, my partner's going berserk. You know, "what are you
doing? You're hurting my relationship..." Everything. But,
eventually, in-house counsel agreed they'd do the guarantee for the
lender. And we handled all other aspects of it.10
We were approached to represent a corporation in an action arising
from a water pollution situation. Our understanding was that we
would represent the corporation in a CERCLA action by the
government for the clean up. And the information that was
transmitted to the partner postured the case that way. The
underlying facts were transmitted in a phone conversation to that
partner, the details of the engagement and the representation were
to follow by correspondence. The partner took pretty detailed notes
of the phone conversation-which is typical-and opened a general
file for the client, who we had not done work for in the past. Work
got to us by referral from another lawyer. We opened the file-that
is, we created a repository and billing codes and all those kinds of
things-and waited for the correspondence to come in. What came
in was a fairly large package of information which the partner who
took the phone call went through and found out that, in fact, the
10. Interview #11 from a Chicago law firm with more than 100 lawyers.
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underlying Superfund case, while going on, was not what we were
being engaged for. We were being engaged to represent the
corporate interest against.. .other potentially responsible parties,
one of whom was one of our clients. This action was intended to be
brought quickly and quietly. And we were now in a pickle. ... We

had to just decline the representation.
The trouble was,
conversations-engagement conversations-never tend to go one
way. And so I had to interrogate-almost like on deposition-my
partner as to what he said to them. I was convinced he hadn't
disclosed anything to the existing clients adversely. And then I told
them that we would have to send this back and we wouldn't be able
to take it on the other side. And I knew we would get it on the other
side. So, I had to put that screen in place, and did. Then, I had to go
back to the other client and nicely tell them that they had
inadvertently misrepresented the engagement to us, but had put us
in a conflict situation and we could not take the case. And then had
to document the fact that the knowledge in our possession would be
never disclosed and send everything back to them with assurances
that no copies had been made. We then did get the call on the other
side a few weeks later and told them we could not take it, without
comment, just couldn't take it. They were not happy and suspected
that we had something to do with the other side. And I thought we
could not even disclose to them what those conversations were. We
simply had to say that there was a conflict situation. Over time it got
smoother. But it was not that smooth at the beginning. They were
not satisfied with the answer, "We can't take on their
representation." Because the question was "why?" And the
pressure it got, it built, it went higher in the company and higher and
finally the general counsel said, "why can't you do this?" And the
other partner and I had a conference call and said, "because it would
put, potentially, put us into a conflict situation with you which we
think we need to avoid. Period.""1
Lawyers fear that a disgruntled client, sent to another firm because
of a conflict of interest will never return. 2 They are especially
unhappy when the inability to bring in this new matter and the risk
that they will lose the client on future engagements will register
3
negatively in their annual compensation-as it does in most firms.'
L2: The greatest problem for me... more so than the issues, are the
people. Because they want the case and they want their fees and
11. Interview #27 from a Chicago firm with 50-99 lawyers.
12. Shapiro, Tangled Loyalties, supra note 1, at ch. 9.
13. For an explanation of how law firms arrange their compensation systems, see:
James D. Cotterman, Compensation Plans for Law Firms (2d ed. 1995); William
Kummel, A Market Approach to Law Firm Economics: A New Model for Pricing,
Billing, Compensation, and Ownership in CorporateLegal Services, 1996 Colum. Bus.
L. Rev. 379; Joseph B. Altonji, Bonuses and Thresholds, Accounting for Law Firms,
Sept. 1996, at 4; Jeff Coburn, Even If It Ain't Broke, You Can Still FLr It: It's Time to
Tune-Up Your PartnerCompensation System, 3 L Firm Partnership & Benefits Rep.
1, 1 (1997).
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they don't want to give it up, no matter what's at stake. And I'm on
the low end of the totem pole, so that's why it's difficult, but... The
issues are really not difficult at all.
Li:... There are no difficult conflicts. There are painful conflicts.
When you have to tell a guy that he can't get... or you have to tell
your firm that you can't have this case, which is going to generate,
you know, you anticipate it's going to generate 3 or $400,000 in fees.
That is a sad day. But deciding it ain't easy.., is not hard. ... And

you have to come to accept the fact that you're just going to have to
say "no." And that may mean that14 you don't get 300 thou. But
that's life. Tomorrow's another day.
I mean, the difficult ones are when you have to tell someone that
they can't do it, they just can't do it, that this is a matter in which,
even if everybody agreed, you still couldn't do it. And lawyers don't
like that. I'm not sure the clients much care for that. But we've had
instances where people have wanted us to represent both sides of
the transaction. Even where it's a relatively friendly transaction ...
And we generally take those and we will simply not be on both sides
of the transaction. It doesn't matter whethet everyone's consented.
As far as we can tell that's just prohibited by the rules, no matter
what. And so that's the hardest to deal with because you're
basically saying you must turn down this work; you cannot do it; you
must go find someone else to represent your client; you must not be
involved. And then there is sort of the internal bickering over, well,
if you can't represent both sides, can we represent one side? And, in
most cases, the answer is "yeah, we could do that." Then you go
fight about which side it's going to be. And that's very difficult
where the parties are both important clients. It may be even worse
that we introduced them and so we brought about the transaction
and now can't be involved in the transaction. In some casesthough those are rare-we've taken the position you can't be on
either side because the clients involved were too important to the
firm. Sort of backwards what you might normally think... And,
therefore, we could not really adequately represent either side...
against the other. And so you had to back off totally. It's not the
nature of the conflict itself that's more difficult to deal with. It's
really the client relationships and attorney relationships that make
those more difficult.1 5
Respondents lament that choosing between the client of one
partner over that of another represents a major source of intra-firm
dissension and conflict. While about a third of the respondents
working in firms of less than one hundred lawyers described collegial
discord stemming from conflicts of interest as at least an occasional
problem, this was true of nine-tenths of those in firms of one hundred

14. Interview #6 from a Chicago firm with more than 100 lawyers.
15. Interview #28 from a Chicago firm with 50-99 lawyers.
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attorneys or more, where conflicts of interest are much more
common.
But, however painful the process and unpleasant the antagonisms,
firms decline cases all the time. 6 Though the majority of respondents
echoed the sentiments expressed above and worried about handling
the personalities of colleagues and clients when the occasional new
engagement gives rise to a potential conflict of interest, few would
characterize such cases as their most difficult. They are just too
common. Conflicts become especially problematic when lawyers
cannot simply walk away, however reluctantly, when the nature of the
case or the structure of their practice paints them into a comer and
moving in any direction detonates yet another conflict or antagonizes
another client. Five scenarios came up frequently:
I. THE DENSITY OF FIRM CLIENTELE

A number of firms "enjoy" geographic, substantive, social, or
cultural monopolies. They are the only lawyer in town or the only
divorce or corporate lawyer in town; they are one of a handful of firms
with expertise in a specialized body of law; or they are one of only a
few attorneys representing an ethnic enclave in the community. As a
result, their clients appear all over their caseload-they are
adversaries, witnesses, victims, co-plaintiffs or co-defendants,
creditors to the same bankruptcy; they hope to consummate
transactions together or to undo them. Firms serving such dense
communities of clients face continual conflicts of interest and
enormous difficulty extricating themselves when the interests of one
butt up against those of another. A few examples from the interviews
illustrate the tension.
(1) A solo practitioner and the only lawyer in a town with a
population of roughly 3,000 is also one of the only criminal defense
lawyers in the region, representing most of its criminals, many of
whom are repeat-players and often adverse to one another:
And our law enforcement in this area, their form of investigation16. Large law firms encounter dozens of conflicts of interest every week, some of
which can only be resolved by declining the prospective engagement. The managing
partner of a Philadelphia law firm of roughly 200 lawyers (not included in my study)
observed: "My theory is that, of every three phone calls I get, I get to take one on as a
client. I've always said that somebody could have a law firm about the size of [this

firm] just taking on our conflicted representations." Harvey Berkman, Sidelined by
Client Conflicts, Nat'l L.J., June 2, 1997, at Al.

Respondents from two very large

firms in my study estimated that, because of conflicts of interest, their firm turned
away a third to more than half of all cases; another two large firms are conflicted out
of tens of millions of dollars of business annually. A few firms in the 35-100 lawyer
range declined hundreds of thousands to a few million dollars in fees each year.
Respondents from a few other firms of varying size estimate that their firms decline
five to ten percent of their prospective business because of conflicts of interest. Even
a ten-lawyer firm in a small town loses $100,000 to conflicts each year.
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and I shouldn't say all law enforcement, but the county officers'
form of investigation-is to get a confession. Barring that, the crime
is not solved. You know, it's really sad but... they get this
confession by whatever means, and, after that, then they look for
some corroboration evidence. Sometimes they do and sometimes
they don't. And the problem is, because they rely so heavily on that,
as opposed to other forms of investigative work, they are willing to
trade with the criminal defendants for that. They'll often tell them,
"well, look, if you'll do this for me,... we'll make you a deal on this

case, or something like that." And, often times, I'm not even privy
to that until after I'm already involved in representing [someone] in
one case. Then this person says-after the fact-that, "gee, he's
asked me to do this thing." And then I discover, while in the midst
of this, that one of my guys is going to be giving a statement against
another one of my clients. In a real rare circumstance, it almost
comes too late to know. ... I recently... was trying a murder case

here. And, on the eve of trial, two of my clients that I had
represented previously- .. , they'd been sentenced or were
scheduled to be taken to the Department of Corrections-made
statements against a third client of mine in the murder case. ... I

really found myself in quite a dilemma. Because I saw these young
men being taken up there to get these statements. And I asked to
speak to them and the officer wouldn't let me speak to them at the
time. And then, when I'd go back up to the jail to talk to him, I'm
advised that they don't want to talk to me. Now, you know, in the
scheme of things, I guess I had mixed loyalties there. Because, on
the one hand, I'm still in active representation of a client who's
charged with murder, and that's a real serious concern for me. But,
on the other hand, these guys are making statements-and they're
headed to the Department of Corrections-that, if they make 'em,
the likelihood of them coming out of the Department of Corrections
alive is not great. And, obviously, law enforcement's not telling
them that. But, you know, I was almost in a Catch-22 situation. I
couldn't get to them to say, "Guys, it's probably not in your interest
to say this." And then I almost have a conflict by saying that,
because I'm really trying to help my other client. Really never
materialized because... I never got to17see them anyway and they
went ahead and made these statements.
(2) Substantive or technological expertise provides a magnet to
attract clients from related industries that often harm collectively-by
dumping pollutants in the same place, producing dangerous products
with related or integrated components, constructing precarious
edifices together-and are accused collectively.1 8 Firms that defend
parties implicated in construction accidents, for example, face the
same local cast of characters from accident to accident, but often
17. Interview #126 from a firm with fewer than 10 lawyers in a small town
downstate.
18. Shapiro, Tangled Loyalties, supra note 1, at ch. 5.
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defend different parties from one case to the next. 19 Because largescale construction projects-especially on the scale of Chicago-style
architecture-require the contribution of so many tradespeople and
contractors, an accident will typically collect a host of potentially
responsible parties, many of whom are long-time clients of a specialist
defense firm.20 The social structure of construction projects creates
repetitive and thorny conflicts for defense specialists. With some
remorse, one respondent described the quagmire he faced when he
chose to stop representing a company he felt did seriously
substandard work, but continued to work on behalf of other
construction companies. He found himself practically foreclosed from
representing any co-defendant of the company from which he sought
to part ways.
One of the things I do in my products work is I represent a lot of
different construction companies. And I represented a company in
a number of actions, where stuff that they had put on buildings had
fallen off. One building collapsed, another building was in the
process. ... And I firmly believe that our job is to represent our
clients' positions as best we can. But, the deeper I got into.., one
of the cases for them, the more I recognized that there was really...
Just from my standpoint, this was not a client that I was happy with
the way they had done this. ... It was clear to me that their work
was substandard, to say the least. The attorney on the other side
was maybe not the brightest person in the world, maybe not even
the best lawyer. And, because of some technical mistakes that he
made really during the trial.... we ended up paying nothing. ...
And so the company was very happy. I did not want to represent
these people again. The more I looked at it, the more I became
convinced that there really were some, if not criminal wrongdoing, it
was very close. I didn't think it was my position -I was representing
this client-to go into details about this and start doing
investigations into... That was somebody else's job. But I didn't
want to represent them again. Well, a case came down the road-a
similar type of construction-and one of the subs [i.e.,
subcontractors] wanted me to represent them. I got involved. At
the same time this company again asked me to represent them and I
refused. ... Because I had so much information on them as far as
their erection methods, they felt that that applied to all cases in the
future. I did not. I mean, to me, when you [put] up a building, each
building is different and... However, we got into quite a little fight
over that. ... And first they tried to get me back involved in the
case for them. Then they were willing to take-if I represented the
other people, if I would represent them as well-they were willing to
waive any potential problem there. And then, when I said I just
simply didn't want to do it any more, then they got a lawyer and
tried to disqualify me from the other, representing other people. I
19. Id
20. Id
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refused to withdraw in that case for a lot of different reasons. And
we got into quite a little fight over that. Those kinds of things can be
difficult, particularly when you've decided you sort of reached the
end of representing a client. Does that mean you're not going to
represent anybody again in litigation that involves them?
Particularly in the kind of work we do, that can be .... Construction
cases, it's all the same people, over and over again ...
And that can
be a problem.21

(3)
Thorny conflicts of interest also arise for lawyers who
concentrate on serving members of particular social networks such as
ethnic groups. Many ethnic group members live together, cluster in
the same industries, work together, transact business together,
socialize together, and intermarry. Hence, the potential for disputes
between group members is quite high. Where the supply of lawyers of
similar ethnicity is low, monopolies develop that ensure that these
attorneys will face an inordinate share of conflicts of interest. A few
Chicago respondents serving ethnic communities from different
corners of the globe acknowledged that they faced such conflicts.
They explained how true adversities of interest were made even more
difficult by engagements that threatened merely social rather than
fiduciary ties and by rigid conceptions among clients of loyalty and
exclusivity, coupled with the high visibility of their practice to ethnic
group members. One respondent explained:
But, you know, in the [ethnic group] community, it's a small closeknit community of businessmen. ... It happens, probably four or

five times a year, at least, that we have existing clients doing
business with each other. And, generally, the clientele we have is
very insulted if we even suggest that they seek another lawyer. So,
we have to be careful how we present things. And we usually end
up referring them out if there's going to be a real conflict. If we're
trying to structure a business conveyance of a restaurant or a
banquet hall or a manufacturing company or something like that,
then we're very careful. And we try to, at least, explain to them that
there is this potential for a conflict. Sometimes, they just refuse to
get other lawyers. ... And they try to count on us to be fair, which

is not something we ever want to try to do. But, it's an unusual
situation. I don't think many other lawyers have that problem in
21. Interview #33 from a Chicago firm with 50-99 lawyers. The respondent
describes the outcome with unusual misgivings:
... I guess in the sense that we ended up staying in the case, it worked out all
right. But... it didn't in the sense that it was a very ugly little situation.
And, probably, it should never have occurred, I guess, in retrospect. Maybe
I wouldn't do it in the same way again. I guess I was vindicated but, you
know, that kind of vindication, at the end, is sort of hollow. The question is
whether you were doing the right things all along, and I don't know... I
guess you make your decisions as you go along. I really don't think there
was a conflict. The court agreed. But it was certainly a situation where it
probably could have been avoided.
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their practice. ... a lot of times, I have just refused to get involved
in things, because I know that there'll be a line of demarcation
drawn between two groups. And I'll have clients in both groups.
And I won't want to put myself in the middle. And that happens
frequently, too.
I'll give you a story... Just so you can have a kind of... a little bit
of an insight as to how they think-how the [ethnicity]-American
businessmen think. I represent a guy I went to high school with who
was born in [country of ethnicity]-an immigrant-from time to
time. He buys out his partner in a restaurant. There is some fraud
involved in concealing certain debts in the restaurant. The partner
that he buys out, his daughter is a dentist. She and her husband are
my clients. She is a good friend of my wife's. The two partners-the
two brothers that eventually buy this other gentleman out-come to
me and want to sue the withdrawing partner, the withdrawing
shareholder. I tell them I really can't do it, because I felt I had a
conflict because of the close relationship I have with that
gentleman's daughter being a client and because of the amount of
times I see him socially during the course of a year. Well, they went
to another lawyer who eventually referred them to a person that's of
counsel to our firm, who has the office next door. He went on
vacation one time, and some emergency matter came up, and I
went-even though there was no technical conflict-I went to court
to help him out. My name appeared on the other firm's billing
statement to the client. The client saw my name, told his daughter
and his son-in-law that their lawyer was trying to hurt them by
hurting him. And it created a little bit of a tense situation with
existing clients. Eventually the of-counsel lawyer came to odds with
the two clients he had. They came back to me looking for me to get
involved in the case. To which, for the second time, I invested
another three or four hours explaining why I couldn't. To which
they were very unhappy with me 2
(4) Many of the lawyers practicing in small towns face the same
personal struggle created by their dense network of clients. Nearly all
of them spoke at length of the difficulties of being entangled in
disputes involving life-long friends, neighbors, the parents of their
children's friends, the members of their church, and divorcing spouses.
At an institutional level, they spoke of disputes between the city and
other municipal institutions, the local bank, the local newspaper, the
hospital, the doctors, the major businesses, many or all of which they
22. Interview #121 from a Chicago firm with fewer than 10 lawyers. This
respondent did not characterize this example as a "most-difficult" conflict because so
many of his conflicts of interest have the same features. Rather, he blames the dense
ethnic network he serves, the fact that so many of the transactions, accidents, and
disputes of his clients are with other members of the ethnic community, the
inflexibility of his clients to seek other counsel, and the fishbowl-like existence in
which he practices as the source of his most wrenching problems, of which there are
many.
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represent. Home-grown lawyers suffer a bit more when they add to
the relational burden the depth of these ties, reflected in the fact that
they went to high school with these people or were close friends since
grade school, once dated their children or siblings, had dinner in their
homes, or called them "aunt" and "uncle." This embeddedness in the
social networks of clients and adversaries is not unique to small-town
life, of course; my interviews contain examples from Chicago
practitioners as well. But the ubiquity of the problem is clearly unique
as are the difficulties that result from the fact that, not only are
lawyers more likely to be embedded in the social networks of their
clients, clients are also more likely to be embedded in the social
networks of other clients (as in the first example of the criminal
defense lawyer).
How do small-town attorneys respond to this constricting web of
social ties? Some took to the roads, fleeing the dense loyalties and
relationships in which they were entangled:
S: Do you worry a little bit about-as your practice expands-that
you're going to be conflicted out of everything?
L: Um hm .... That's why the attorneys in the smaller towns spread
out and go to different surrounding counties. Like I'm trying to
expand down into [adjacent county to the east] County and [nearby
county to the west] County. And I do a lot of work over in [adjacent
county to the north] County, where ... I don't know anyone. [Town
about 25 miles away], the same way, and [adjacent county to the
west] County and, you know, I don't know as many people over
there-I mean nowhere near as many people. And, if two people
come in-or a person comes in to me-there's probably a 90%
chance I don't know them, never heard of them, and don't know the
other side either. ... a gentleman downstairs, he's an attorney; he's
in sole practice. He lives in [a nearby town] and practices here in
[this town] and enjoys it because he doesn't have a lot of these
conflicts like I do. Where, if he practiced in [the nearby town], it
would be similar to me practicing in [this town].'
After reflecting on these burdens, another respondent suggested:
Sometimes you think the perfect situation would be to live a
hundred miles away from where you practice. I think maybe city
lawyers have this advantage, where they can separate their social life
much more from their practice to some degree. In many cases, they
can, I suppose. Say you're a high-powered anti-trust litigator in a
Chicago law firm. You probably live in the suburbs somewhere. So
you probably don't have any connection at all in your social lifeyour children's family life, etc.-with your practice. Whereas, in a

23. Interview #112 from a firm with fewer than 10 lawyers in a small town
downstate.
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small town, everybody knows you, and knows you're
a member of
24
that law firm, and it permeates everything you do.

(5) Aging provides another trajectory for amassing difficult
conflicts. Older transactional lawyers, especially those who represent
family businesses, often become entangled over the years in the social
networks of their clients, just as if they inhabited a small town. 5 As
family businesses and family members face crises and new
opportunities, as clients marry, divorce, remarry, and reproduce, as
they age, retire, and die, as businesses grow and undergo succession
planning, lawyers come to represent additional branches of the family
tree and new generations-some with incompatible interests. Neither
of the following stories, told by two septuagenarians, was described as
"the most difficult;" rather, they were recounted as archetypes of the
difficulty the respondents continually face, given the nature of their
practice. The senior partner of one of the largest firms in a large city
downstate recounted the first story, with genuine angst.
L: I had a business where I represented them for, why, I'll bet you
thirty, forty, fifty years. The principal stockholder wrote his will and
rewrote his will, and everything else. And we worked up a way that
the employees could buy out the business as they went along. And
the man died. And it ends up that the executor decides we have a
conflict and they retain another lawyer. And when we try to
represent the business, why, they say that we've got a conflict
because we know too much about it, and so forth. So we withdraw.
We end up no longer having the estate, nor representing the
business. And everybody on both sides are angry at us, because we
haven't completed what we had done along the way. And you have
a sense of, "gosh, it's a shame!" ... And it was a matter where-

over the past two years-the principal had been in the hospital
thinking that he was dying and calling me up on the phone. And,
"[names himself], I want to change my will. And I want to be sure
that this is done." And we're rushing up to the hospital to get his
information and getting a codicil executed and that type of thing.
And holding his hand and doing the whole thing. And then-there
it's gone. ... You see, that's the type of business that the lawyer

could very well fall into in a community of this size-if you do
represent a small business and you know the family and they look to
you. You're their counselor. They tell the other members of the
family, "There's a question? Call [names himself]." It's just that
simple.
S: And were you to say-when they call-"I can't talk to you
because I'm not wearing that hat?"

24. Interview #97 from a firm with fewer than 10 lawyers in a small town
downstate.
25. Shapiro, Tangled Loyalties, supra note 1, at chs. 2, 4.
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26
L: They'd be shocked. "You can't do that!,

The second account, from a small Chicago firm, involves a more
complex family business, with three generations, multiple siblings, inlaws, and cousins, some in the business and some not, with very
different needs and lifestyles, and a lawyer who has been serving the
business and various members of the family for almost forty years.
L:... I have lots of conflicts when I represent family businesses and
every member of the family. And they're all shareholders and
sometimes two or three generations. And their interests are
different. They're not really technically adverse, but occasionally
they get to be adverse. ... if there develops a real hostile situation,
then I can't represent anybody. But, normally, I'm a sort of
"godfather" and everybody knows that I'm representing the
grandfather and the grandchildren and the business and so forth.
And there's nothing very formal about it. I haven't had much
trouble with it, mainly because there's been peace. Occasionally I'm
put into family situations because there's a conflict-and I'm totally
neutral. But, more often, it's a business that I've represented for
thirty-five, forty years. Just per force they turn to me and,
occasionally, conflicts. If it's ever a real conflict-in the sense of
hostility-I don't serve anybody. I just say, "I'll represent the
business if you want me to. You guys go get separate lawyers." It
hasn't happened often. I represent one company where I represent
every member of the family. I'm trustee of shares in a trust under a
will. I'm trustee of a voting trust. I really am-for all practical
purposes-control of the company. And I've never exercised it.
And, if they have a fight, then it gets resolved that I'm representing
the company. But, you know, their interests aren't all the same.
Because, when you get down a generation, some of them need
money, some don't need money. Some are rich, some are poor.
Some want to see the company grow, some want more money out of
the company. ... Those are relatively hard situations. But I just
simply don't act. I let them sort it out and work it out. ... The
members of the family are a mother and five daughters. The
husband of one of the daughters runs the business. The amount of
his salary and bonus is an inherent conflict because, the more he
gets, the less there is left for the others. In fact, that's how I first got
hired. They were in a fight over his employment contract-whether
to pay dividends or leave the money in the business. It was a
conflict in the sense that people have different needs. ... Well,
originally, they resolved it with a whole bunch of lawyers. And then
they made peace and there's been peace ever since. When the
mother dies and the "girls"-as I call them; they're all over sixty...
fifties and sixties-become the real parties in interest, they may have
a fight. Some may want to sell out. Should the corporation buy?
Should other shareholders buy? Some may think, "well, we'll get
our best money by selling the whole business to somebody else."
26. Interview #54 from a firm with 20-49 lawyers in a large city downstate.
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The husband of the one daughter who runs the business now has his
son in the business and none of the cousins is in. There could be
some tension. I don't know if there will be conflict.
S: And who would be your client at that point?
L: Well, my client, per force-just by time-is the business and the
son-in-law who runs it, cause-and his son. Cause those are the
people I deal with every day-every day. I could end up with no
client. I'm sufficiently conflicted. And if any of the daughters object
to my continuing to represent the company-because I'm really the
president's lawyer... He had a separate lawyer 'til about three
years ago, four years ago. He did all his personal stuff. But I'm
terribly identified with him at this point, because I work for him ...
When the mother dies-this is the goose that lays the golden eggfor the first time, the girls will have significant income-which now
goes to the mother mostly. And that cures lots of things. You
know, a school teacher will have 50, 60, 70,000 dollars in additional
income. Chances are, she's going to be pleased. But they may not.
They may decide, "well, the other guy gets salary first. It should
come out of his piece or her piece." It's easy to have problems. I'm
hopeful we don't. They've been very successful with the operation.
The problem with the business-it's kind of interesting-is the sonin-law-the head of the business-was brought in by his father-inlaw. The father-in-law ran a [describes business].., almost a junk
business. This guy has converted the thing to a [describes business].
Huge success. It has no relationship to what the father-in-law
started. His reality is he made this business. The girls' reality is he
fell into this business. Her father set him up in the business and, but
for that, he wouldn't amount to anything. That's a conflict. And it
surfaces all the time. I happened to be at [an] eightieth birthday
party of the mother-in-law of one of the girls-who happens to be a
client of mine-unrelated to this. And I'm very friendly with this
daughter and her husband. So, I said to her, "is it more peaceful
than it used to be?" (It clearly is.) And she said, "well, there's
never going to be peace as long as he-the president-gets so much
more than we get." And she's married to a lawyer... who is very
successful and she doesn't need the money. I think she's half talking
for herself, but mostly talking for two or three of her sisters who
are-not poverty-but poor under any comparative basis, say, to the
president and to this girl... So, you know, that conflict is not my
conflict. But, as long as I'm sitting there, I could be conflicted if
they get into a fight. You know, if this girl, for instance, said to me,
"well, you represent the president. I really don't want you in this
argument," I'd have to get out. No question about that. Whether I
should on my own initiative... It just seems to me it's working so
well. It's crazy. But I'm very, very conscious of that kind of
conflict. 27

27. Interview #80 from a Chicago firm with 10-19 lawyers.
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II. THE PASSAGE OF TIME

Just as conflicts become more intractable as lawyers age, they also
do so as cases ripen. Conflicts almost always become worse with the
unremitting passage of time. Things change over time, things about
which lawyers may bear no responsibility or have any knowledge and
that they never could have anticipated. 2s Though engagements begin
with no actual or even potential conflicts in sight, something happens
down the road, often far away from the purview or activities of the
lawyers, that detonates an unforeseen conflict of interest.
Organizations continually hire and fire personnel, add or lose
members or partners or offices, change their owners and directors,
expand or downsize, raid the competition, gobble up other
organizations or get gobbled up themselves, divest less productive
divisions, declare bankruptcy, make, break, and restructure alliances.
Respondents offered numerous examples where personal or corporate
marriages, divorces, and reconfigurations scrambled client interests
and their firm was caught in the middle, championing incompatible
interests with no easy way to escape. For example, midway through
an engagement, a corporate client acquires or merges with another.
Suddenly the law firm is sitting on both sides of the bargaining table
or suing its own client.
Li: Last year, we had to, in a particular engagement, turn down a
longstanding client of the firm-an ongoing matter-seek
replacement of counsel. ... This was a three to four month
negotiation process between two longstanding clients of the firm...
on a specific matter, where we've been representing one client in
connection with a contract negotiation-basically with a contract
which was falling apart. There was a potential for litigation. There
was another corporate client on the other side. Wasn't originally on
28. In the "old days," law firms would probably know about major changes in the
structure, operation, or interests of their clients, because they usually engineered

these changes. Today, because clients are less likely to engage a single firm as their
general counsel, instead parceling out their legal business to various law firms, their
outside counsel are much less likely to be aware that the client contemplates or has
even consummated a merger, moved into a new line of business or divested another,
initiated or was named in a law suit, etc. See Marc Galanter & Thomas Palay,
Tournament of Lawyers: The Transformation of the Big Law Firm 32-35 (1991);
Shapiro, Tangled Loyalties, supra note 1, at ch. 4. Therefore, they face greater
difficulty staying apprised of the interests of their varied clients and choreographing
their caseload and commitments to avoid conflicts or those likely to detonate.
Indeed, for this and other reasons, many clients have recently begun to reduce the
number of outside firms. See William Kummel, Law Firm Economics: Deconstructing
Pricing,Billing, Compensation and Ownership,4 L. Firm Partnership & Benefits Rep.
4 (1998); David Rubenstein, Many Outside Legal Budgets Increase; Fewer Firms Will
Get More Work, Corp. Legal Times, Jan. 1991, at 1; Mark Schauerte, In-house
Counsel Turn Back the Clock While Increasingthe Hours for Firms, Chi. Law., Aug.
2000, at 10; James D. Shomper & Peter Jenkins, Partnering:Paradigm or a Passing
Trend?, N.Y. L.J., Nov. 23, 1999, at 5. See generally The Task Force on Conflicts of
Interest, Conflict of Interest Issues, 50 Bus. Law. 1381 (1995).
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the other side, but acquired the company with which we were
dealing. And.. .suddenly a conflict arose a year and a half into the
engagement. ... We discovered it.

We contacted the corporate

client on the other side. They said, "absolutely not. We will not
waive this conflict. Too bad!" They used conflict as a sword. Our
representation of the two clients were totally unrelated-the parent
company and the one was totally unrelated. But we were adverse to
their interests and we attempted to negotiate a waiver. We
attempted to negotiate something on the lines of, "well, we will only
represent this client up to the point we go to litigation. If you go to
litigation, we refer it out." They wouldn't do it. The client on the
other side just had a policy, "we will not let any law firm that
represents us be adverse to us. Period." Did we really have to
withdraw in the representation? As an ethical matter, I can't say
that we did. We, in fact, consulted with [an ethics expert outside the
firm]. Got his views on it. He said, "well technically, you probably
could proceed with this. This is more of a business question." Well,
we ended up withdrawing. We ended up replacing counsel in
connection with the side we'd been representing through this.
Brought someone else in. We cut our fees and, in fact, we wrote off
a substantial amount of our fees and brought somebody new in to
represent the existing client. ...

[That] was the worst conflict

situation I've ever seen. I personally met-even though I had no
involvement with either client-personally met with both clients,
discussed the matter with them. It was a very difficult situation with
two longstanding clients of the firm, where the conflict had arisen
after the fact. That was the worst conflict situation, because you
were balancing internal politics between two very highly respected
partners of the firm, two longstanding clients of the firm, an ongoing
relationship with one client. Fees being written off. Everybody
being unhappy with the result internally. The clients not being
harmed, but being29distracted by a conflict issue. That was the worst
one I can think of.
In a second interview in the firm, a different respondent reflected
on the same conflict:
L2: It's not just when a new matter or new client comes in

...

it

may arise when you're working for a client. And we've had a couple
of those come up where we've run into a conflict sort of after things
have started progressing down where we've discovered a conflict.
And those have taken a long time to resolve. I mean, we've spent
on one conflict trying to resolve it with clients, we've spent maybe 50
to 100 hours... trying to resolve [the conflict described by L1]talking to both clients and trying to work it out and seeing whether
there was some grounds that both clients would be satisfied with.
In other instances, as clients acquire new operations and move into
new lines of business, they gradually become direct competitors:

29. Interview #1 from a Chicago firm with more than 100 lawyers.
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I think the toughest one involved the communications industry
where we had two clients who were close to being equally worthy.
And we had to decide which client we were going to keep and which
we were going to send away.

...

there was no way we could

continue to represent both. They were turning into direct
competitors and they made it fairly clear we had to choose. And
that involved partners who had strong feelings about, obviously,
their own clients. And so it turned out, I think, to be more of the
application of business judgment than
30 strict conflicts rules. But
those are where it's the most difficult.
Or they get into disputes with other clients.
The minute you have more than one client, you can conceive of
undertaking something for client A that's going to be adverse to the
interests of client B. Situations where a client may come in to have a
trademark recorded. And then, subsequently, that client decides to
ship merchandise to an entity that goes into bankruptcy, an entity
who'd been borrowing money from a bank that the firm represents.
A bank that might have some security interest in assets of the
bankrupt-which would include the property that was shipped in by
this client for whom you did the trademark work -can present some
very interesting problems in adversity of interest. There are many
situations where you cannot find out whether you have an existing
client involved in a matter at all. And it subsequently surfaces. You
can be into a matter for months-if not years-and then somebody
stands up and starts screaming that you've got a conflict. Not
because you're in litigation against them, not because you're
negotiating a transaction with them on the other side of the tablenone of that, none of the easy part of it. It's just you're doing
31
something which they don't like. Those are your hardest conflicts.
But clients are not the only things changing over time.
The problem, though, is that, every day that you work on a case, you
learn more about it. It's an ongoing thing. You really don't know
what a case is about when you first take it. So it is likely 32that
problems will emerge that were difficult to identify at the outset.
Lawyers invariably learn more about their clients and about the
matters for which they have been engaged as time goes by. They meet
with their clients and question associates, witnesses, and experts.
They study complaints, pleadings, and indictments. They examine
records, documents and physical evidence. They conduct depositions
and discovery, as do counselors representing co-parties and
adversaries in the case.
As lawyers learn more about the social organization of the events
alleged in a lawsuit, they often find that the network of co30. Interview #7 from a Chicago firm with more than 100 lawyers.
31. Interview #23 from a Chicago firm with more than 100 lawyers.
32. Interview #69 from a Chicago firm with 20-49 lawyers.
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participants, facilitators, and victims is broader than they had
originally assumed. Somewhere in the pesky web, an unexpected
client-whose interests these lawyers also have an obligation to
honor-has become entangled. Over time, attorneys on the other side
may also discover new parties that are blameworthy or responsible for
the events in question. Or, in order to pass, spread, or deflect the
blame to others or to amass deeper pockets from which to secure
compensation, these other lawyers may bring new parties into the
litigation. Some of the ancillary parties or witnesses, recruited or
dragged into the case at the eleventh hour by other people's lawyers,
will be clients of the original firm, whose interests must be considered
and honored. Matters that were originally conflict-free suddenly
explode down the road when other people's lawyers-sometimes
strategically to conflict their adversaries out 3 3-bring new parties into
the case.
Li: Most of the time you're going to be... you might be too far into
something to resign. ... One of the biggest problems that you can
face these days is representing somebody in litigation and finding
out, after you've been working on a matter for a year, that they
ought to sue one of your other clients in addition to the three parties
they've already named. That can be very troublesome.
S: And what do you do?
Li: That's one where you might ask for a consent. First of all, you
would try to dream up some theory of why they're not really a client.
That it's only their subsidiary or a brother or sister company that
you represented. You have a real problem. Because it would not be
in the best interest of your first client if you pulled out of the case
because you were already a year into it. And, in the second case,
you can't tell them that they shouldn't sue a particular party. So
maybe if you ask what are the most difficult problems you have, that
might very well be it. ... It's probably surprising that doesn't
happen more than it does. Because you don't really know all the
time at the beginning who all the proper defendants are..%
Another respondent explained:
I think the most difficult... it seems to me that, if you are in
litigation, and then, because of some subsequent development in
that litigation, there is a third party action and ... newly discovered
33. Such strategic behavior can be found in the arsenal of so-called "scorchedearth," "hardball," or "Rambo-like" litigation tactics. See generally Bryant Garth,
From Civil Litigation to PrivateJustice Legal Practiceat War with the Profession and
its Values, 59 Brook. L. Rev. 931 (1993). By conflicting adversaries out of a case,
firms enjoy strategic advantage. Forcing legal counsel to withdraw at the eleventh
hour protracts the litigation, increases its cost, and exerts extra pressure on the client
to settle the matter rather than find and prepare a new, less experienced law firm to
represent it. See generally Shapiro, Tangled Loyalties, supra note 1. at ch. 8.
34. Interview #3 from a Chicago firm with more than 100 lawyers.
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facts which bring new players into the litigation-additional
defendants, additional plaintiffs, what have you-and, particularly,
after there's been a substantial investment by the client in our
services to that point. Coming up with a workable solution that
forthrightly addresses the conflict and-if it involves then
withdrawal-resolving it on a basis that's equitable. For instance,
you're in a case that's been going on for a year and a half. Now
there's a third-party action. You've got a conflict as a consequence
of that third-party action. New counsel will have to come up to
speed. You've got to turn over the file. Who bears the cost of that
coming on? And who bears the cost of that transition? And what's
really fair35to the protection of the interests of the client in that
situation?
Though the fallout from a detonating conflict is usually more
destructive in the course of litigation, other legal matters are not
immune.
Transactions sometimes grow as well with time, as
additional investors, lenders, guarantors, underwriters, bidders,
36
subcontractors, insurers, and others join or help to close the deal parties with incompatible interests, which may be clients of the
original law firm.
Other respondents complain that their most difficult conflicts arose
when, over time, they discovered inculpatory evidence that placed the
blame on another firm client.
If you get into the case ... and, all of a sudden, the doctors say,
"well, gee, the nurse didn't.. ."or we discover the nurse didn't follow
the medication orders and you're going to stick it to the nurse...
That actually happened in a case we had. And the hospital [liable
for mistakes by its nursing staff] got very angry at us because we
represented the doctors. And one of our paralegals-she did a great
job-she noticed that the ... nurses do not follow the doctor's
orders-orders of the doctor being sued. ... I don't think the
plaintiff realized that he had a good claim against the hospitalwhich it was. So he was just pushing against the doctors. And then
our investigation revealed, "hey, it's the nurses screwed up." And so
we shifted all our defense-in the discovery depositions-against the
hospital. Which, of course, the plaintiff was real happy about. And
our doctor, he was happy we found out it wasn't his fault, really.
But then the hospital was kind of, "how come the law firm that we
have used in the past-and might use in the future-is going to stick
us for big bucks?" [laughter] We laughed
about it years later. But,
3
at the time, it was a little bit delicate.
The configuration of interests shifts in a case not only because
clients change or attorneys unearth new evidence or bring in new
35. Interview #49 from a firm with 20-49 lawyers in a large city downstate.
36. Shapiro, Tangled Loyalties, supra note 1, at ch. 6.
37. Interview #67 from a firm with 10-19 lawyers in a downstate medium-sized
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parties or witnesses. As matters unfold, the relationships among the
parties evolve and interests may begin to collide.
L2: Well, there are situations where you get involved with cases.
There's no conflict in the beginning, but later-and you represent a
number of corporations and individuals-and down the road, a year
or so, you find yourself, when you're representing individuals, that
there's a conflict amongst them-factually. Then you have to go to
the person [in the insurance company] from whom you've received
the assignment, tell them of this particular conflict and then say,
"what are we going to do?" In our business.... you can split the
defense and give certain individuals to certain other lawyers, or you
say, "you know,.. . irrespective of the conflict, you're going to have
to represent everybody," or you can settle the case.
S: This is, you mean, a situation where you have co-defendants
whose interests diverge in the course of litigation?
L2: Correct, right. And you're representing them all. And, in those
situations you have three choices and that's it. And it's very simple
to... If they don't want to split the defense, then your job is to
make sure there's a waiver- s amongst all the defendants, that they
know-there's a conscious waiver-that they know there's a conflict
and they sign off authorizing you to continue representing them.
Or the case is settled.39
When more than one of the parties is a client of the firm (whether
or not the firm is representing more than one of them simultaneously
in the particular matter), the collision may paralyze lawyers who
cannot champion all of what have become incompatible interests. The
collisions may occur at any point along the way or at significant
transition points in the case. Because the legal process is so
protracted, it provides a period of time in which the needs, priorities,
resources, and interests of various parties diverge. A complex matter
has myriad junctures requiring the exercise of discretion that
continually test unanimity and consensus. Because reputations and
fortunes embedded in tangled webs of collaborators are at stake,
paranoia and disunity loom under the surface. When outcomes are
zero-sum, they are inherently divisive. Finally, because costs or
awards must be split, they provide an opportunity to fracture alliances
yet again.
There are a number of critical turning points in the evolution of a
case at which alliances are torn asunder, adversities become more

38. Rule 1.8 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct states that clients, fully
informed of the nature of a conflict, can consent to representation by a lawyer who

has a conflict of interest, under certain circumstances, and thereby "waive" the
conflict of interest. Model Rules, supra note 3, R 1.8.
39. Interview #15 from a Chicago firm with more than 100 lawyers.
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direct and virulent, and conflicts of interest explode. This happens,
for example, when negotiations break down and litigation looms:
L2: We are a major financial firm representing a lot of banks.
We're also a major corporate firm. Corporations are frequently
borrowers, many times, from our banking clients-unrelated
matters. When you're doing a new deal, everyone's very happy to
see you on, say, the borrower's side, when, ordinarily, you're on the
bank side or vice versa. Because everyone wants the deal to go
through, the conflicts are rather easily waived. If the deal sours, if
economic times become harder, if there's a difference of opinion
that develops between the borrower and the lender, we then find
ourselves in a situation where one side or the other may be
increasingly uncomfortable with having us be there. Clearly, at the
point of litigation, we'll have to exit without a consent. But the
difficult issue is when there is sufficient adversity that we should be
getting consents to continue-fresh consents-when the old
consents for the deal going in don't any longer really apply. And it's
a very difficult interplay of the conflict rules and client relation rules.
Because clients then get a "fer-me or agin-me" kind of attitude
when things are getting tough. The other area...
S: Could I just stop you for a second? What would be some of the
red flags that would make you feel that we better think about some
fresh consents or that the level of adversity is changing?
L2: Well, frequently, the clients give you their own cue that they're
not comfortable having you on the other side. If it's an ongoing
matter with ongoing discussions, you can pretty much gauge whether
there is a continuing comfort level with your being on the other side,
where they'll tell you that they think it's so adverse that you need to,
that they want to set a limit on how far you can go. The only other
way is just very fact-specific judgments about what it is you're doing
on the matter.
LI: I would just add to that, that, even with consent, the ethical
rules say you have to be comfortable that you can rigorously and
vigorously represent the client that you're choosing to continue
with-the client in other areas on the other side. And sometimes
you can't honestly say to yourself you're going to give your all
because the client on the other side is simply too important. ... It's
a subjective test. You go back to your client and say you just can't
do this any more.
L2: And that actually segues to the other area which is very difficult
where, at the outset, no matter, you have no conflict. And, through
nothing that you as a firm have done-or nothing inappropriateyou get hired by the party on the other side on an unrelated matter
or whatever or there's a corporate reorganization, acquisition,
divestiture. All of a sudden you find yourself in a conflict position.
And, as innocent as we may feel that this was just sprung upon us, it
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can be very difficult to sort out what the appropriate thing to do is
with the clients.
Li: ... the problem can arise when there are multiple defendants

who you think are aligned on the same side. And, as the case
develops, they turn on each other and...
L2: And frequently, that's X number of years down the road....
and exiting at that point is enormously difficult. Because one client
has already invested a lot of time and effort in getting us up to
speed, paid us a lot of fees, etc.
Li: And getting advanced consents are equally difficult because,
usually, when these cases start out, everyone wants to present a
united front and not let another defendant know that, "if worse
comes to worse and we lose, it's really their fault. They're 90% to
blame and we're going after them." No one likes to think of those
things. They're all gung-ho to beat up on the plaintiff, if they're all
defendants. And these issues sometimes are not addressed as
quickly as they should be. Or no one can foresee the facts as they
develop. Everyone may think that, if we take down defendant A,
defendant B really was a passive bystander in this whole process.
And we don't understand why they were even joined by the plaintiff
as a defendant, and maybe they don't either. But a year goes by,
and in discovery, smoking guns come out of the woodwork, and
they're clearly to blame, and there's no advance consent, and all hell
breaks loose.
L2: It's a wonderful mixed metaphor.
Li: Thank you. [laughter]41
Conflicts can also detonate when consensus erodes and co-parties
begin pointing fingers at one another, or when one of multiple parties
is offered a deal that is not offered to the others:
I represented multiple business entities as defendants. And the
plaintiff's lawyer offered to settle the case with some of my clients
and not the others. That was after the case had been pending like
four years and we were a year away from the trial. You can see that,
on the surface, if I'd accepted that offer without thinking about itbecause I thought it might have been a good thing for those who
were being offered a settlement-I'd be funding the fight to
continue against my other clients. So, I- ... not alone, but with
two other lawyers-dug into the facts and the law and the rules of
40. Variably called "advance consents" or "advance" or "prospective" waivers,

clients agree that they will not seek to disqualify the firm for taking advantage of
future opportunities that are adverse to their interests, but unrelated to the matter for
which they engaged the firm or any of the confidences they shared with their lawyers.
See generally ABA Standing Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op.

93-372 (1993).
41. Interview #5 from a Chicago firm with more than 100 lawyers.
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ethics and decided that it was not in the best interest of those
offered a settlement to take it. That was both a legal and a factual
thing. I then disclosed to everybody what had happened and told
those who had been offered the settlement that, if they disagreed, to
let me know. And I gave the reasons why I thought it wasn't a good
settlement. That was very difficult ....
And we did have a letter, by
the way, which I had drafted at the beginning that, if there were
conflicts, that I could withdraw from, as I remember it, from some,
but not the others. But, if I had concluded that it would have been
in the best interest of those who had been offered the settlement to
get out, I certainly could not have continued in that representation
of the whole group.... I would have had to [withdraw]. Because
there was obviously going to be a conflict then. That one stuck in
my memory as the most troublesome one because it took us, maybe
it was four or five days before we could really feel comfortable with
the rules of ethics and the facts in the law that our conclusion was
correct. I happened to have been vindicated, because the case did
go to a jury and all of the defendants were found "not guilty."
But... you don't know what's going to happen, when you're making
that decision.42
Settlement negotiations represent another turning point. Some
parties may be more risk averse-and more willing to settle-than
others, better able to afford financing continued litigation, less willing
to admit culpability or responsibility, better insured or better able to
withstand a monetary contribution to a settlement. 43 A final turning
point comes after a verdict, when guilty parties cross-claim or seek
contributions from others, or victorious co-plaintiffs disagree about
how to allocate the judgment.
About three years ago I represented a group of homeowners. We
were plaintiffs in that action. Everything went fine until I settled it
and then it was an issue of how we were going to split up the
proceeds. I maxed out on both defendants' policies. I had a total
of... it's either nine or eleven clients. And the issue was, "okay,
how are we going to divvy this stuff up?" Because we couldn't really
break it up based upon a per capita basis. It had to have some
relationship to the loss that had been sustained by each of these
parties. And, basically, what I did was I called everybody in. ... I

ordered some pizzas and some beer. The beer was had after the
agreement was reached. ... And the deal was, "look folks, here are

a few alternatives. If you can't agree, I'm going to have this money
paid into the court and the court can decide it. Now, does that really
mean you each need to retain alternate counsel? Well, it might, you
know, for that stage of it. You've all agreed that you wanted to
settle this thing for this amount." And, you know, at that point,
"here's what I suggest." And there were a couple of alternatives.
And truly, I said, "we can do it based on the number of units. If
42. Interview #4 from a Chicago firm with more than 100 lawyers.
43. Shapiro, Tangled Loyalties, supra note 1, at ch. 4.
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you're a unit owner... " And, there were a total of five units that

were represented. So there must have been nine people. And I
said, "we can take the total amount and divide it by five. That
would mean that one person was actually getting a double share."
... Another way was to say, "okay, there are nine people; divide the

total amount by nine.

Another way is to base it on your total

amount of your loss- ... the proportion that held to the proceeds."

When we ended up, we settled it based upon splitting it five ways in
equal shares. Why? Everybody's loss was speculative. And
everybody had actually been reimbursed through insurance for,
really, 100% of their loss. And what we ended up with was "gravy,"
so to speak. So, they all decided to do it that way. ... Let me just

put it this way: if I had it to do all over again, I could have
represented one or two of those people, gotten the same amountjust on one. Because, seriously, I should never have taken all of
them.

...

You know, honestly,

I had never been in that

circumstance before. And, what I did was I went over to the law
library and tried to see what I could find as far as any research on
the issue. There isn't much, as you know. And what I came up with,
was I called around to some of my friends who were senior members
of the bar. And they said, "why don't you try this, [names himself]."
And, basically, I winged it.44
As this last respondent suggests, lawyers are not always blameless
when conflicts detonate in the middle of a case. As, in several of these
accounts, firms sometimes elect to represent more than one party or
to participate in engagements in which other clients are co-parties,
even though they are represented in the case by a different law firm.
And many attorneys know the cast of characters that typically
populates the world in which they practice-the polluters, asbestos
component
lenders,
companies,
construction
producers,
manufacturers, insurers, and so on, some of them clients, some with
deep pockets, some probably culpable-all standing on the sidelines,
likely to be dragged into the case at some point. When clients realize
that their counselors could have foreseen the conflicts that have
suddenly disrupted their case and paralyzed their lawyers, they are
even more irate and uncooperative than in some of the examples cited
above, in which conflicts arose through no fault of the lawyers., The
difficulties of extricating themselves, while honoring their obligations
to clients and respecting the rules of legal ethics' can be formidable.
44. Interview #86 from a Collar County firm with fewer than 10 lawyers.
45. Shapiro, Tangled Loyalties, supra note 1, at chs. 8, 10.
46. These rules include the confidentiality rule in Model Rules, supra note 2, R.
1.6, and the so-called "hot-potato rule." Enunciated in a series of state and federal
court opinions, the "hot-potato rule" directs that "[a] firm may not drop a client like a
hot potato, especially if it is in order to keep happy a far more lucrative client," and
that conflicts of interest cannot be cured by severing the relationship with the preexisting or less favored client. Picker Int'l Inc. v. Vairan Assoc., Inc., 670 F. Supp.
1363, 1365 (N.D. Ohio 1987), afJ'd, 869 F.2d 578 (Fed. Cir. 1989); see also Flatt v.
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Some firms, therefore, try to avoid these difficult conflicts by
reading the tea leaves, anticipating the potential cast of characters
likely to be dragged into the case at the eleventh hour, assessing the
likelihood that the evidence will inculpate some co-parties more than
others or that they will eventually turn on one another, and so on at
the outset. When lawyers anticipate the possibility that a conflict will
detonate down the road, they can choose to decline the case or refuse
to represent more than one party, disclose the risk to the prospective
client so that it can choose to find representation elsewhere, disclose
in advance how the firm will respond to various potential
contingencies, or secure waivers.47 Many other firms scoff at such
fortune telling, however, indicating that the risks are too ethereal to
estimate and that making such disclosures to clients at the courtship
stage will simply scare them away or undermine the new relationship.
They tell me that they will deal with conflicts that, because of the
passage of time, will become more difficult, if and when they arise.
III. POSITIONAL CONFLICTS

L: The hardest ones are when they're not really conflicts, but
they're institutional conflict issues. What cases should we not get
into, or should we get into, what sides of issues? And this has just
arisen the last three or four years-what I would call "issues"
conflicts, institutional policies, not taking certain types of cases.
That's not our tradition. Our tradition is we're cowboys-whoever
wants to hire us to shoot, that's what we do. And this is very much
counter-culture to us.
S: And what accounts for the change?
L: Well because the nature of the practice changes and, as we
represent larger and larger institutions, corporations, we are more
identified with the establishment.
And, therefore, antiestablishment types of lawsuits are bad for us. For example, taking a
high profile case before the United States Supreme Court in favor of
punitive damages-that's very much against the interests of most of
our clients. That's not to say that if [large corporation in the
Military-Industrial Complex] wanted to sue Ms. Shapiro and wanted
to collect millions of dollars in punitive damages-they don't care,
that's fine. But to have the constitutionality of punitive damages
sustained by the United States Supreme Court is very bad for [that
corporation] and all the manufacturers. They don't like it. Certain
rules relating to expert witnesses: the more loose the rules are as to
who's an expert and on what subject, that's bad for defendants-and
we represent defendants. So that would be a bad institutional issue.
Telling corporations they can't cut down trees is bad. ... Well, you
Superior Court, 885 P.2d 950, 957-59 (Cal. 1994); Truck Ins. Exch. v. Fireman's Fund
Ins. Co., 6 Cal. App. 4th 1050, 1057 (1992).
47. Shapiro, Tangled Loyalties, supra note 1, at ch. 9.
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lose clients, I mean, you just lose clients. . . . That's the thing that's
be sad. But
vexing us. ... It won't be the wild west anymore. It'll
4
there you are. ... I think it hurts us. But it's reality. 8

Respondents in many of the largest firms identify "positional" or
"issue" conflicts,49 in which lawyers advance a position in the

representation of a client which is inconsistent with the interests of
other clients who are neither parties to the case nor have any direct
stake in it, as among their most difficult. Positional conflicts are
world-class business conflicts, especially when the positions in
contention are deeply held by large, powerful, repeat-playing
institutions-the staple of large law firms. Again, the difficulties
engendered by positional conflicts are rarely legal ones; they are
about business, client relations, and intra-firm politics, about how to
serve the needs of important clients without undermining or alienating
others.
By far the most nettlesome positional conflict faced by firms in the
sample had been resolved long before I conducted my interviews. But
the wounds were still healing, and virtually every respondent from a
large law firm recounted the same story, if not the same resolution:
Our firm represents the insurance industry. The firm was beginning
to represent corporate America on Superfund environmental issues.
It took a while for the bell to ring. Superfund matters kick out a lot
of parties. On a single site, we might be representing the insurer and
[a chemical company]. There has developed a war between
corporate America and insurance companies over environmental
coverage issues. It's a multi-billion dollar issue. .... There's no legal
conflict, but a business conflict. We had lots of discussion about this
within the [New Business] Committee and eventually the process
crystallized. The firm decided not to take Superfund cases. Period.
As a result, a group of lawyers left the firm. This is a problem that I
understand other firms are facing as well. This was by far one of the
from
thorniest issues in my experience. We had to remove ourselves
5
these cases and that was hard to do. These were huge cases. f
But, though the war over environmental coverage disputes has
abated,51 with some firms maintaining fidelity to corporate America
and others to those who provide insurance coverage for
environmental pollution-and collections of lawyers who represent
the losing side forced out of the firm as a result -conflicts over other
sorts of issues and positions continue to bedevil large law firms, as the
plaintive ex-cowboy lamented. Moreover, since the continued
48. Interview #30 from a Chicago firm with more than 100 la%%yers.
49. See generally John S. Dzienkowski, PositionalConflicts of Interest, 71 Tex. L
Rev. 457 (1993).
50. Interview #22 from a Chicago firm with more than 100 lawyers.
51. See generally Shapiro, Tangled Loyalties, supra note 1, at ch. 5; M. Elizabeth
Medaglia & Peter A. von Mehren, Beyond Asbestos and Environmental Litigation:
Coverage Disputes in the Twenty-First Century, 33 Tort & Ins. I.J. 1023 (1998).
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representation of entire industries is often at stake, positional conflicts
are especially likely to roil, if not fracture, law firms, as colleagues,
arrayed on both sides of the divide, are forced to turn away new
business or watch their clients flee because of the positions
championed by those on the other side.
But there are some kinds of work which may-in and of
themselves-be inconsistent. It is very difficult to have a substantial
environmental practice in representing corporate America in
connection with their environmental problems-on the one handand have any kind of a substantial insurance company clientele. The
coverage issues are huge. And it is very difficult to be known and
affiliated with the financial institutions of this country in helping
them with their loans and their problem credits on the one hand,
and be representing debtors in bankruptcy proceedings on the other.
This is done. It can be accommodated in the right situation. But I
think it's these overall "positional problems" that are the most
pervasive, and in some ways insidious. Again, it goes to the fact that
a lot of clients believe that once they become a client, they're a
client on all issues, rather than just looking to the law firm to protect
that client's interests within the scope of the engagement that was
given. I mean that really-that should be the law. If a client comes
in and wants trademark work done, that's what they want done.
And it is the request of the client that defines the scope of the
engagement and defines the scope of the responsibility that goes
with that engagement. If you're doing everything for a client as
general counsel, it creates one set of responsibilities for the law firm.
But if somebody comes in the door and hires you to do one type of
work or one small project, that client should not be in a position to
foreclose its agent-in effect-from handling other matters that are
unrelated to the agency. And maybe the law will get there some
day. It isn't exactly clear, but there is some support for that
proposition. And it's the biggest problems of all-are these
positional conflicts. Which clients believe that once they become a
client of 52the firm, that they've got a right to keep you from
asserting.
IV. LATERAL HIRING
Lawyer mobility exacerbates conflicts of interest. As attorneys
travel through the job market,53 passing through revolving doors and
from firm to firm, they accumulate the confidences of and duties owed
to each collection of current and former clients they encounter along
the way.54 Career mobility not only multiplies the conflicts of interest
faced by these migratory lawyers, but, because of the imputed

52. Interview #23 from a Chicago firm with more than 100 lawyers.
53. Shapiro, Tangled Loyalties, supra note 1, at ch. 7.
54. Model Rules, supra note 3, R. 1.6 & 1.9.
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disqualification rule,55 those of everyone they affiliate with as they
move from job to job. They become so-called "typhoid Marys",5
conflicting out thousands of their colleagues and forcing their new
firms to turn away substantial amounts of prospective business tainted
by their prior affiliations. It is not surprising that several respondents
recalled that their most difficult conflicts of interest arose in the
context of lateral hiring. Once again, the difficulty was not about the
legal rules surrounding imputation or about evaluating whether the
lateral hire would create a conflict of interest; it was over the
wrenching negotiations about what to do when a conflict was
unmistakable. In many instances, the conflict was identified before
the lateral hire was consummated and, with some acrimony and
chagrin, the offer was rescinded, just as new business that portends
conflicts of interest is painfully declined.
Well, there's one that I'm aware of that had to do with a possible
opportunity to hire a lateral who... We had lengthy discussions
with this individual and thought that there was going to be a real
opportunity to put together a deal with this person. And kind of at
the eleventh hour, he made it known to us that his client-his
principal client that he was going to bring into our firm-had some
very ongoing, bitter litigation with another company that we were
doing some pretty minor work for. And so we talked about that,
and we said, "well, we don't know that we see this as a problem."
Well he did and said he thought maybe the only way we could get it
resolved was, not through the consent route, but rather, we might
have to consider turning back the work that we already had. And
we looked at that and thought that we would possibly be subject to
criticism for doing that, cause this was business already in the firm.
And there's a couple of cases that seem to suggest that you just can't
willy-nilly dump work back in order to favor your firm with more
lucrative stuff. So, as a result, we lost this lateral opportunity,
because of what appeared... I guess it was a legitimate conflict.
But it was fairly minor-minor in terms of the small amount of work
our firm was doing for this other company, so.... That was a call
that our Executive Committee, I think, had to make. And
we just
57
said, "we just can't do that." So that deal fell apart for us.
In other accounts, the laterals were already on board and conflicts
arose between cases and clients that they hoped to bring with them
and clients of their host firm.
55. The imputed disqualification rule states that: "While lawyers are associated in

a firm, none of them shall knowingly represent a client when any one of them

practicing alone would be prohibited from doing so .... Id. R. 1.10(a). Therefore,
the conflicts of any one lawyer in a law firm-no matter how large the firm or how
far-flung its offices-are imputed to all lawyers in the firm, regardless of whether they

have had any contact with the particular client or were privy to any of its confidences.
56. Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. & W. William Hodes, The Law of Lawyering: A
Handbook on the Model Rules of Professional Conduct 321 (2d ed. 1990).
57. Interview #15 from a Chicago firm with more than 100 lawyers.
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The most difficult one that I had -and it's the only one in four years
that I've taken to the Executive Committee.... And by utter
coincidence, it's the only ... formal vote I've been involved in in the
Executive Committee for four years. We felt we should go of
record, so that people would know how we voted on this. And it
was a close vote. It was dealing with a trade association, a few of
whose members were going to be joined in some litigation-it was in
the nuclear energy field-joined in some possible litigation in
southern California, where we had been asked to represent private
parties suing certain utilities. And we have been general counsel
forever for the [names a trade association] -a very, very active trade
association. Then that gets into "who's the client?"-these
individuals or the Association? And we had to ferret through
contacts with the individual utilities. ...

Because you're not

automatically deemed to be the attorney for the members of an
association. That doesn't necessarily follow. And so you have to
gather some facts. So, that was a very difficult issue for us to sort
out. And we concluded that there was a conflict, because we hadover the course of many years-we had done a fair amount of work
for individual members, including some of the target defendants on
the west coast. And when it came to, "should we ask these members
of the Association for a consent," we voted not to. And that's where
we went to the vote on "was there a conflict?" Yes, there was.
"What should we do about it," was the much more difficult issue.
And there we voted "no" for a good reason. The issues that were
being raised were gut issues for members of the Trade Association.
And to have the lawyers-who have been the Trade Association's
lawyers for twenty years-be on the other side of a gut issue for the
Trade Association and, therefore, its members, would have been
bad. .. . The group of lawyers... on the west coast who were urging

us to seek consent, were brand new to the firm. So we had a
business issue internally... So we had the more peculiar business
setting of a group of lawyers who had just joined the firm, who felt
very strongly, "Gee how, how could you? We're just... We want to
prove ourselves in [names firm]. We've got this great opportunity.
Just ask for consent. That's the least.. ." And we say, "well yeah,
but you don't understand." "Well, why didn't you tell us that when
we joined?" "Well, we didn't know that you were going to have
this." So that was a particularly thorny issue. That was complicated.
It wasn't complicated intellectually; it was complicated in the
personal relationship. And that's where I felt that-in fairness to
the new attorneys who had joined us on the west coast-that the
decision should not be made by our Committee or by me. ... I've

taken it to the highest counsels of the firm. Full presentation,
opportunity to think about it, and then we went to a vote. Which is
what we did. So, I think that was the most difficult one that we've
handled.58
Li: Actually, I think the toughest... one that they went to the
58. Interview #16 from a Chicago firm with more 100 lawyers.
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Executive Committee on. [names, I believe, the lawyer involved.]
L2: Yeah.
Li: That was a pretty close question. Although, I think we both
agreed. Yeah, the issue in this one was whether... We were
representing a party in a piece of litigation. And the case had come
in through a lateral hire-come with someone who had joined us
laterally. And another partner in the firm had-about four years
ago-consulted with a former attorney on the other side to act as an
expert witness. Had a very brief meeting; learned two or three little
facts and was ultimately not hired as an expert. And that, I think,
was the issue. And we concluded that ... it was enough of an
apparent conflict so that we had to withdraw. Now, that was pretty
close. We did a lot of research on that and...
L2: I think that was a conservative stance...
Ll: ... the attorney that brought in the case was very unhappy
and...
L2: Because it was a very good client of hers.
Li: Yeah, very... Yeah. And she was not happy. But, you know,
I'm convinced we were right. And the Executive Committee agreed
with us and ultimately she calmed down.
L2: That's one we had researched. I mean we had...
Li: Yeah, very heavily...
L2:... a formal memo prepared.
Li: ... a rather lengthy one. But, that was a pretty close question.19
Other respondents described, as their most difficult case, a
disqualification motion that was brought for a conflict of interest that
arose from the amalgamation of new interests occasioned by a law
firm merger.
I suppose the toughest one I've ever faced was this case I got
disqualified. And that was a former client substantial relationship
problem. And I had filed a lawsuit before we merged with [names
current firm] and [names current firm] had represented the
defendants in another matter that related to the same business
problems. And all of the same words were there. I was convinced
there was... I'm still convinced that it was not a substantial
relationship, that, while the words were there, we were really on the
same side of the issue. ... But, well, couldn't make the judge in
California understand it.60
59. Interview #37 from Chicago firm with 50-99 lawyers.
60. Interview #2 from a Chicago firm with more than 100 lawyers.
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V. TRIANGULAR RELATIONSHIPS

Geoffrey
Hazard
coined the term "triangular
lawyer
relationships ' 61 to denote those relationships in which the party who
pays the legal fees is different from the party being represented. Such
triangles are most common where insurance policies provide for the
defense of liability claims against policyholders, but are also found
where parents pay for the representation of a minor, or where
litigation is supported by a public defender or public interest group.62
Conflicts of interest, of course, surge through these triangles, as
lawyers are torn between their fiduciary obligations to their client and
the often-incompatible interests of those who pay their bills and with
whom they often have long-term relationships. Indeed, the most
common Freudian slip committed throughout the interviews occurred
when respondents erroneously called these benefactors "clients."
(Only a few caught and corrected themselves).
Countless hours of interview time were consumed with stories from
many quarters about the tensions, frustrations, and temptations that
arise from the conflicts of interest inherent in insurance defense work.
What is interesting, however, is that many examples of the most
difficult conflicts faced by the respondent or his63 firm could be found
within these triangles. Each respondent prefaced his story by
explaining to me that, in days of yore, blatant conflicts of interest were
commonplace in insurance defense work. For example:
Good Lord, you know, thirty-four years ago, one of the first cases in
that was where the attorney representing the individual,
deliberately-at his own client's deposition-asked some questions
which, in effect, voided his coverage. And then told the insurance
carrier and they disclaimed coverage. And nobody saw that as a
64
conflict until that time. Well, obviously, it is.
But, the respondent continued, all of that changed a decade or two
ago in a series of opinions that clarified lawyers' ethical obligations in
insurance defense work and provided a series of road maps that
helped them maneuver safely through this ethically-charged triangle.
The conflicts now are no-brainers. Even insurance companies and
adjusters understand and comply.
But, if the legal issues are clear, why are some of them still so
difficult? For the same reason that many of the other stories
recounted above are difficult-because they threaten significant social
and economic relationships. Lawyers are obliged to ignore-indeed,
61. Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., TriangularLawyer Relationships: An Exploratory
Analysis, 1 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 15 (1987); see also Brooke Wunnicke, The Eternal
Triangle: Standards of Ethical Representation by the Insurance Defense Lawyer, 31:2
For the Defense 7 (1989).
62. Shapiro, Tangled Loyalties, supra notel, at ch. 4.
63. More than nine-tenths of the respondents were male.
64. Interview #66 from a Chicago firm with 20-49 lawyers.
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sometimes even flaunt or undermine-the interests of those
responsible for a substantial amount of future income in favor of the
interests of fly-by-night clients wielding no sanctions or incentives to
insure fidelity and whom lawyers will most likely never see again.
You know, I
Our biggest problem is really not real conflicts.
have a very strong belief that whatever client you're representing,
that you represent them to the best of your ability. And you should
do all those things necessary to win-within certain parameters.
Once you're in those, I mean, gloves, pretty much, are off. ... I
mean, once you get to the courtroom, it's a fight. And the question
is: who fights their way out of it the best? And sometimes what
happens is not a conflict. But, let's say, for example, you have a
client where three companies have asked you to represent a
different client. And now you're in the middle of a hell of a fight.
There's no conflict per se. But, companies that send you a lot of
business... Insurance companies can become very disenchanted
with the fact that you're kicking one of their insureds in a fight,
where now the defendants have decided that they've going to fight
with each other. That happens. And, fortunately, most companies
recognize the fact. And even when they get upset, you tell them,
"Well, if I were representing you here, would you want me to back
off merely because that other person also sends me business?" Well,
they always answer that "No." And most of them recognize that.
But that's an ongoing problem that all firms that do our kind of
work face. And that is that it's rare that.... in the cases we're in,
that the other defendants that are in the case are probably not
assigned to attorneys that that client-that is, the insurance
company-also assigns you business. ... It's inevitable almost every
case we're in. Then the question is: how do you handle it? How do
you get into a situation so you don't annoy the other client? Well, I
think what you've got to do is you represent the client in the case,
who is the insured, not the insurance company. And you have to do
your best.65
A downstate lawyer elaborated on the difficulty:
I have terrific conceptual problems with insurance defense-type
cases-terrific problems. I may have a problem of how far I can go
in pressing the insured's interest against the party who is paying my
bill? A problem of how far can I hammer another insurance
company that I also represent? Taking plaintiffs cases against
defendants who I know are going to be represented by insurance
companies that I represent. Professionally, I can divorce those
questions pretty easily because I know what the law is. It is the gray
area... When you get in that gray area, that's when it becomes a
tough question. And, obviously, you just do the best you can and
you probably err on the side of staying away from the-what even

65. Interview #33 from a Chicago firm with 50-99 lawyers.
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may appear to be-the conflict. Just because you just don't want
the
66
hassle. You don't want the problem. I don't want the problem.
Potential conflicts among the interests of insurers, insureds, and
lawyers surface at several junctures in the defense of a liability claim:
(1) disputes about insurance coverage (which, though a bit more
subtle than in the days of yore, still exist); (2) disputes about litigating
versus settling the charges, especially when the claim exceeds the
amount of coverage; and (3) disputes about the expenditure of funds
for the defense of the insured. Respondents expressed difficulty with
all of these, especially with the last. In an age of belt-tightening and
cost controls in legal services,67 lawyers face a tension between their
obligation to provide-and the client's expectation of-a painstaking,
vigorous defense and the insurer's preference to minimize defense
costs.
Though this downstate respondent did not identify the
following account as his most difficult, he was certainly very exercised
about it:
But where you get into a problem... is when the insurance
companies-because they're so cost conscious-will send you a file
and they'll say, you know, "protect the interest of the insured.
Follow the appropriate pleadings, motion, whatever." And the next
sentence says, "do not start any discovery until we notify you." Or
they'll say, "minimize the amount of discovery." I know they're
looking at the cost side of it. Well that puts you in a real box.
Because your duty is owed to the client, not to the insurance
company at that point. And, yet, if you send a bill say, to the
insurance company, and you show, say, a thousand dollars of
interrogatories, some paper chase or some depositions-and you
aren't authorized to do it, but yet you feel you have to do it to learn
things about the case, that can cause a conflict. And we've just gone
ahead and did it. We just go ahead and do what we think has to be
done. We get these letters and I look at them and say, "that's
interesting, but I'm the one to be sued [for malpractice], not the
insurance company." So that's what we do. . . . I'm sure any lawyer

that does defense work has gotten these letters from insurance
companies. "Cut down costs, cut down costs." And things like,
"don't use any more than ten hours of legal research." Right!
[laughter] ... And we'll send a bill in. And somebody up in never-

never land-with a red pencil-goes through these. He will audit
my statements and says, "Ah ha! I see ten point five hours of legal
research. [laughter] We're going to dock you for point five hours."
So, you think, "geez, you know, come on!" So that's a conflict ...
You owe your duty to your client to do as much as you can, what
66. Interview #54 from a firm with 20-49 lawyers located in a large city downstate.

67. See generally Committee on Lawyer Business Ethics, Business and Ethics
Implications of Alternative Billing Practices: Report on Alternative Billing

Arrangements, 54 Bus. Law. 175 (1998); Jonathan P. Bellis & Rees W. Morrison,
Inside, Looking Out, Nat'l L.J., Dec. 2, 1991, at Si; Rubenstein, supra note 28;
Shapiro, Tangled Loyalties, supra note 1, at ch. 4.
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you think is appropriate. And someone else is trying to put a dollar

bill on that and say, "don't do it." So, yeah, that comes up with
clients sometimes.
CONCLUSION-WHERE'S THE LAW?

The accounts quoted above represent only a small handful of
problematic cases and wrenching dilemmas that lawyers shared with
me during the interviews, some of which they identified as "most
difficult" and many of which they did not. What is striking as one
reads the thousands of pages of interview transcripts chronicling
difficult and mundane conflicts alike, is how infrequently respondents
struggled with legal doctrine and interpretation. They complain that
the rules are anachronistic; they berate the bar associations for
providing so little practical guidance; they criticize the literature for
being useless, naive, and out of touch with their reality. But, when
you ask them about their major challenges they talk like economists,
psychologists, and sociologists.
Could it be that legal scholarship is largely irrelevant to the
Everests of everyday practice? And, if so, why? Several compelling
hypotheses come to mind. Perhaps respondents felt that a non-lawyer
would not understand or be interested in legal doctrine and
technicalities, and they dumbed down the interviews for my benefit.
While that may be true for some, many respondents cited ethics rules
and court opinions ad nauseum and quite a few confused me for a
lawyer, asking about my practice and expressing some shock when I
explained why I did not have one. Surely this alone cannot explain
the rarity with which the lawyers wrestled with purely legal questions.
Maybe the tapestries woven on Everest are not irrelevant; they
have simply done their job very well-seamlessly, in fact. Perhaps
legal education has become so effective and legal cases, opinions,
commentary, and scholarship have become so accessible to lawyers
that legal analysis is relatively unproblematic-at least to the conflicts
czars and firm leaders who I interviewed. Or perhaps the legal calls
are made easily because firms consult wvith experts on the difficult
ones. A good number of respondents indicated that, from time to
time, their firm had hired a well-known law professor or called the bar
association, their malpractice insurer, an ethics advisory service, or a
respected member of the bar when they sought greater expertise.
(Though frequently they hired experts merely to demonstrate to a
client or the court that they were trying to do the right thing in a
contentious conflicts case.69) Perhaps the law of conflict of interest is
not that difficult. As one respondent observed:
68. Interview #67 from a firm with 10-19 lawyers located in a medium-sized city
downstate.
69. And, invariably, it seemed that the experts would either validate the
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Any eight year old, usually, can tell ya when you're on thin ice and
doing what you shouldn't be doing vis a vis clients. I mean, it's, you
know, pretty common sense.7°

Maybe the culprit is in the terminology. As is apparent from the
examples, respondents use the term "difficult" in different ways. For
some, it is their worst case. For others, it pertains to a generic
category or tension. For some, it is where the expenditure of time to
unravel the tangled loyalties was inordinate or the consequences most
draconian. And for others, it is the most painful or embarrassing
experience, arousing the most irate clients or most fractious intra-firm
discord. Perhaps, then, some respondents interpreted the word
"difficult" to apply to the social rather than to the substantive.
But the hypothesis that rings most true to me was offered at the
very beginning of this piece by the big-firm respondent who suggested:
The complexity of the conflict law is there and it presents a problem.
And we're lawyers; we can deal with those things. You make
decisions. Sometimes you're right and sometimes you're wrong, as
the cases decide later. But you make decisions ...

that's what

lawyers do.71
In short, interpreting legal doctrine is what lawyers do; that is their
craft. It is what lawyers are not trained to do-to predict the future,
read minds, make peace, calm irate clients and colleagues, make
business decisions, and avoid entanglements-that many find most
problematic. To a mountain climber, the most difficult part of
ascending Everest is not climbing the mountain. It is predicting and
responding to the weather, reading the mountain, knowing when to
ascend and when to turn back, fixing malfunctioning equipment,
rescuing an ailing comrade, motivating the sherpa, fighting altitude
sickness, and struggling with one's demons. Successful mountain
climbers have mastered such ancillary skills though, of course, the cost
of failure is quite a bit higher than in legal practice.
The view from the base camp yields two lessons. First, just as we do
not send neophytes to climb up Everest without teaching them
something about the weather, perhaps it is time to develop the
ancillary skills that lawyers find most challenging. Our traditional
cases, through which we train lawyers and reveal the law to
practitioners, do not reveal enough. Cases should include not just the
facts, but also social context, history, social change, personalities,
relationships, power, competition, markets, social networks,
generations, community, ethnicity, career, mobility, social
organization, law firm culture, structure, expertise, sophistication,
respondent's opinion or dismiss the problem as a business rather than an ethics
question.
70. Interview #66 from a Chicago firm with 20-49 lawyers.
71. Interview #11 from a Chicago firm with more than 100 lawyers.
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insurance arrangements, compensation, economics-all of the
seemingly innocuous and idiosyncratic color of a case that often make
it so difficult.
Second, because the difficulties are rarely about legal questions, few
Everests of the mundane make it to the summit. Or if they do, the
irrelevant and weighty baggage of social context is typically stripped
away by the time the grueling ascent is completed and documented in
a legal opinion. As a result, scholars who exclusively search for cases
in this rarified environment are blind to so much of the reality of legal
practice and, oblivious to the issues for which practitioners cry out for
expert guidance, are unable to offer their counsel.

Notes & Observations

